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The Impacts of 9/11 
on Canada-U.S. Trade
by Steven Globerman, Ph.D., 
and Paul Storer, Ph.D.INTRODUCTION
The 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington have had profound global 
economic and political effects. One consequence of the tragedy is heightened security 
concerns surrounding the movement of goods and people across international borders 
that, in turn, have raised the prospects of substantial disruptions of international 
trade. Within the Canada-U.S. context, numerous observers have identified increased 
regulations and intensified inspection procedures at the Canada-U.S. border as con-
tributing to significantly higher shipping costs and shipment delays. The higher costs 
and associated disruptions to commercial shipments might be inferred to discourage 
growth of trade between the two countries. It is now widely accepted that economic 
integration between the Canadian and U.S. economies is, on balance, an important 
contributor to the economic health of both economies, especially Canada’s. Develop-
ments that might attenuate the growth and “deepening” of North American economic 
integration therefore threaten the economic welfare of Canadians and Americans, and 
their nature and magnitude are worthy of careful analysis. 
prove policymaking in this area.
The main purpose of this study is to 
identify the impacts of post-9/11 se-
curity developments on bilateral trade 
between Canada and the United States. 
Specifically, the study provides a sta-
tistical analysis of the extent to which 
bilateral trade flows fall short of their 
“expected” levels in the post-9/11 peri-
od. It provides estimates of trade short-
falls for both U.S. exports to Canada 
and U.S. imports from Canada on an 
aggregate level, as well as separately 
for the largest U.S. land ports. One key 
finding of the study is that both U.S. 
exports to and imports from Canada 
were lower than they would otherwise 
have been in the post-9/11 period giv-
en traditional determinants of bilateral 
Clearly, national security has become 
a much more pressing policy goal in 
the two countries post 9-11. Neverthe-
less, policymakers need to be aware of 
the costs of initiatives to promote in-
creased security in order to balance the 
benefits and costs of specific initiatives, 
and eliminate (or modify) those whose 
costs outweigh their benefits in terms 
of improved security. Moreover, the 
relevant costs might be capable of be-
ing reduced without unduly compro-
mising security through a reallocation 
of resources across government pro-
grams, as well as within the operations 
of specific agencies. In short, a greater 
understanding of how post-9/11 secu-
rity-related developments are affecting 
economic circumstances can help im-
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falls” decreased in relative magnitude 
after 2003; however, whereas the short-
fall for U.S. exports to Canada had ef-
fectively disappeared by the middle of 
2005, a significant shortfall for U.S. im-
ports from Canada continued to persist 
through mid-2005. This finding sup-
ports a view expressed by some observ-
ers that Canadian exporters have been 
relatively disadvantaged compared to 
U.S. exporters by post-9/11 security-re-
lated developments.
Another empirical finding is that 
trade shortfalls are not uniform across 
land ports at the Canada-U.S. border. 
Indeed, significant differences can be 
identified across ports in the extent of 
the identified trade shortfalls. For ex-
ample, whereas statistically significant 
shortfalls in U.S. imports from Canada 
can be identified for the ports of Blaine, 
Champlain / Rouses Point and Port Hu-
ron through mid-2005, the shortfalls 
identified in the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11 had essentially disappeared for 
the ports of Buffalo and Detroit by 2003. 
Further analysis suggests that differences 
across ports are not obviously linked to 
differences in the mix of commodities 
processed through the individual ports. 
A more plausible explanation appears 
to be the mix of transport modes serv-
ing the ports. Specifically, ports that are 
more intensive users of rail as a trans-
port mode are more likely to evidence a 
persistent import shortfall. 
The study proceeds as follows. Initial-
ly, an overview of the growth and com-
modity composition of bilateral trade is 
presented by way of background. This is 
followed by an evaluation and synthe-
sis of various studies that provide most-
ly indirect insights into the impacts of 
post-9/11 security developments on bi-
lateral trade. We then set out our own 
statistical methodology for identifying 
the impacts of 9/11 on bilateral trade 
flows and present quantitative esti-
mates of the impacts for both overall 
U.S. export and import trade with Can-
ada, as well as for exports and imports 
crossing through major land ports. The 
conclusions from the statistical analysis 
are evaluated against the background 
of more qualitative evidence, including 
small case studies of the main trading 
industries. The study concludes with 
a set of policy conclusions and recom-
mendations. 
OVERVIEW OF  
CANADA-U.S.TRADE
Canada-U.S. trade constitutes the 
largest bilateral trade relationship in 
the world. Moreover, levels of histori-
cal bilateral trade flows understate the 
importance of a smoothly function-
ing border between the two countries, 
since much of the production that 
takes place in each country relies upon 
just-in-time supply of inputs shipped 
across the border. 
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volume of bilateral trade, the industrial 
composition of traded goods is fairly 
concentrated. Looking at the value of 
U.S. imports from Canada, the 15 largest 
importing industries in 2004 accounted 
for around 55% of total Canadian ex-
ports to the United States in that year. 
Motor vehicles alone accounted for over 
16% of the value of total U.S.-bound 
Canadian exports. Total exports of five 
segments of the broader transportation 
equipment sector account for approxi-
mately 22% of the value of U.S. mer-
chandise imports from Canada. Other 
major Canadian export industries in-
clude energy (oil and gas and petroleum 
products) and forest products (wood 
and paper products). 
The industrial composition of U.S. 
exports to Canada is less concentrated 
than the industrial composition of 
U.S. imports from Canada. Neverthe-
less, transportation equipment exports 
to Canada are quite important for the 
United States. Specifically, motor ve-
hicles account for slightly more than 
9% of all U.S. merchandise exports to 
Canada in 2004. Six transportation 
equipment-related sectors collectively 
account for almost 25% of U.S. exports 
to Canada. 
For the most part, the composition of 
the leading export and import sectors 
remained fairly constant over the 1990s 
and the early 2000s. The implication is 
that significant post-9/11 impacts on bi-
lateral trade should be observable with 
reference to a relatively small number 
of industries.
It should also be noted that bilateral 
trade is concentrated in a relatively 
small number of ports. Specifically, of 
the estimated 75 land ports along the 
Canada-U.S. border, just three account 
for the bulk of bilateral trade. Two are 
at the border between Michigan and 
Ontario (Detroit and Port Huron) and 
one is at the border between New York 
and Ontario (Buffalo-Niagara Falls). The 
concentration of commercial shipments 
at the Michigan ports is to be expected 
given the prominence of transportation 
equipment in overall bilateral trade. 
Furthermore, most non-motor vehicle 
manufactured goods produced in Cana-
da originate in Ontario and Quebec and 
also cross into the United States at entry 
points in Michigan and New York. 
The overwhelming bulk of merchan-
dise shipped between Canada and the 
United States employs surface modes 
of transportation, essentially truck and 
rail. In 2002, around 61% (by value) of 
U.S. imports from Canada was shipped 
by truck and an additional 24% was 
shipped by rail. For U.S. exports to Can-
ada, approximately 78% was shipped by 
truck and 9% by rail. 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
A wide range of explicit and implicit 
incremental costs has been associated 
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mented since 9/11. One approach to 
identifying those costs involves estima-
tion of the changes in waiting times 
and the variability of waiting times 
post-9/11. A second approach involves 
estimates of the incremental costs to 
shippers associated with longer and 
more variable wait times at the border. 
A third utilizes evidence on the reaction 
of shippers to post-9/11 developments. 
In particular, have shippers been willing 
to incur specific costs in order to miti-
gate border delays and uncertainties, 
and what are the magnitudes of the 
costs that have been willingly incurred? 
A fourth approach evaluates whether, 
and to what extent, commercial and 
private vehicle border crossings have 
changed over time. No available study, 
to our knowledge, attempts to estimate 
directly the impact of post-9/11 border 
security developments on bilateral trade 
flows.
The available body of evidence sug-
gests that significant additional costs 
and delays were imposed on shippers 
in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Ef-
forts made by the two governments to 
mitigate the impacts of the disruptions, 
in particular the dispatching of the Na-
tional Guard to border crossings, ap-
parently mitigated some of the adverse 
impacts and facilitated reductions in 
average wait times; however, it appears 
that delays and timing uncertainties as-
sociated with border crossings remain 
greater problems than they were prior 
to 9/11. Moreover, the delays and uncer-
tainties regarding crossing times impose 
significant costs on shippers. Nonethe-
less, there is little evidence of shippers 
initiating changes in mode shipment 
choice or border crossing times and lo-
cations in response to the border cross-
ing disruptions identified. Nor is there 
strong evidence that the number of 
trucks crossing the border has declined 
relative to the growth of overall eco-
nomic activity. In light of the fairly lim-
ited and mixed evidence regarding the 
impact of added costs on trade flows, 
additional empirical evidence on the 
issue seems useful.  To our knowledge, 
our study is the first that links bilateral 
trade flows to 9/11.
METHODOLOGY
The methodology followed by the 
study involves the specification and 
estimation of U.S. export and import 
equations. The particular specification 
chosen is derived from the gravity mod-
el of trade. This well-established model 
is built around the notion that trade be-
tween any two countries should grow as 
the size of each trading partner increas-
es. Conversely, the greater the physical 
distance between any two countries, 
the greater should be the transportation 
costs and, therefore, the smaller the vol-
ume of trade. This basic gravity model 
is usually augmented by incorporating 
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port and import equations, particularly 
relevant exchange rate relationships. 
Since the basic focus of the investi-
gation is on changes in bilateral trade 
flows over time, the specification of the 
benchmark gravity model focuses on 
the main determinants of U.S. imports 
from and exports to Canada over time. 
For the import equation, the dependent 
variable is the nominal (U.S.) dollar 
value of U.S. imports from Canada. One 
independent variable is nominal (U.S.) 
dollar value of the U.S. GDP. A second 
independent variable is the Canada-U.S. 
exchange rate specified as the number of 
Canadian dollars per U.S. dollar. Since 
our observations are quarterly over the 
period 1996 (Quarter 1) through 2005 
(Quarter 2) for U.S. imports, we also in-
clude dummy variables for the second, 
third and fourth quarters of each year.1 
For the export equation, the dependent 
variable is the nominal (U.S.) dollar 
value of U.S. exports to Canada. The 
measure of economic activity is the U.S. 
dollar value of Canada’s GDP. All other 
independent variables are specified as 
in the U.S. import equation.
The time-sensitive variable of most di-
rect relevance to this study is the mag-
nitude of the explicit and implicit costs 
associated with security-related devel-
opments. Since no such time series is 
available, we must rely upon indirect 
approaches to identifying changes in 
the magnitude of these costs over time. 
The general approach chosen is to as-
sume that the costs differ between the 
pre and post-9/11 period. One speci-
fication incorporating this assump-
tion would involve the use of a single 
dummy independent variable that takes 
a value of zero for all quarters prior to 
the third quarter of 2001 and a value of 
unity for all other quarters. This speci-
fication would effectively incorporate 
the assumption that the costs of border 
security-related procedures increased 
“once-and-for-all” after 9/11. While 
this assumption cannot be ruled out au-
tomatically, it seems unlikely in light of 
comments made by managers and gov-
ernment officials involved in bilateral 
trade. Specifically, it seems more likely 
that, while costs did increase substan-
tially after 9/11, there were periods of 
time when the relevant costs decreased 
as well as increased.
In the absence of reliable information 
about the time series behavior of securi-
ty-related costs to shippers and produc-
ers involved in bilateral trade, it seems 
advisable to employ a general specifica-
tion that identifies a separate time pe-
riod dummy variable for each quarterly 
observation commencing with the third 
quarter of 2001. For example, one inde-
pendent variable would take a value of 
unity for 2001 Quarter 3 and zero for 
all other time periods. A second inde-
pendent variable would take a value of 
unity for 2001 Quarter 4 and zero for 
all other time periods, and so forth. This 
  1Missing data limited 
our time series for U.S. 
exports to Canada to the 
period 1997 Quarter 1 
through 2005 Quarter 2.
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of time on the dependent variable to 
vary between time periods post 9/11. 
This approach seems more appropriate 
than “forcing” specific time patterns on 
the data in the absence of strong theo-
retical reasons for assuming one or an-
other more specific pattern.
Several other issues are relevant in 
specifying the export and import equa-
tions. One is whether the independent 
variables should be specified as contem-
porary or entered with a lag structure. 
It is reasonable to expect that changes 
in overall economic activity and the ex-
change rate will influence exports and 
imports with a lag, and other research 
suggests that the lags can be as long as 
six quarters. Again, rather than impos-
ing an a priori lag structure, alterna-
tive lags for the GDP and exchange rate 
variables are specified, and a selection 
is made based upon which lag provides 
the best statistical results. A second spec-
ification issue is whether the dependent 
variable and one or more independent 
variables should be specified as linear or 
log-linear terms. Both theoretical con-
siderations, as well as empirical results, 
support the inclusion of the dependent 
variables and the GDP variables in log 
form. 
DATA SOURCES  
AND STATISTICAL RESULTS
The source of data for the trade flows 
is the Foreign Trade Division of the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census. The Bureau’s un-
published database identifies exports 
and imports for every U.S. port of en-
try with commodity detail provided at 
the 5-digit SITC level. Data for the inde-
pendent variables were obtained from 
Statistics Canada (Canadian GDP), the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S. 
GDP) and the Federal Reserve (Canada-
U.S. exchange rate).
In the initial estimated model, the 
import and export equations are esti-
mated over the period 1996 Q1 through 
2001 Quarter 2. The goal was to identify 
an economically and statistically reli-
able model to serve as a “benchmark” 
specification to which the time series 
variables would be added for samples 
that include data from after the second 
quarter of 2001. The parsimonious U.S. 
import equation performs quite well. In 
this model, the natural log value of U.S. 
imports from Canada is a function of 
the natural log value of U.S. GDP, the 
Canada-U.S. exchange rate, the season-
al dummy variables, and a set of port 
dummy variables that identify the 10 
largest U.S. ports through which Cana-
dian imports pass. The estimation results 
for the U.S. export equation are not as 
satisfactory as for the import equation. 
In particular, the exchange rate coeffi-
cient often takes the “wrong” sign. Nev-
ertheless, the overall goodness of fit of 
the export equation is quite good and 
seems acceptable to use as a benchmark 
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can be added. 
The preferred specifications of the 
import and export equations estimated 
over the period through 2001 Quarter 
2 were then re-estimated over the full 
sample period adding the quarterly time 
dummy variables described earlier. The 
goal was to identify whether the time 
series variables are statistically signifi-
cant and, if so, the size of their effects. A 
significant post-9/11 impact is suggest-
ed by time series plots shown in Figures 
1 and 2. Specifically, the data summa-
rized in these charts show a downward 
movement in both imports and exports 
between 2001 and 2002, although the 
movement is more evident in the case 
of U.S. imports from Canada. 
When the time dummy variables are 
included in the import equation and the 
equation is estimated over the full time 
period through 2005 Quarter 2, the most 
salient result is the negative pattern of 
coefficients for the dummy variables. 
Specifically, all of the coefficients for the 
time dummy variables are negative and 
statistically significant. This result indi-
cates that U.S. imports from Canada in 
the post-9/11 period were below levels 
that could have been expected holding 
constant macroeconomic determinants 
of trade, as well as seasonal influences 
on trade. The import “shortfall” for 
each time period following 9/11 is sum-
marized in Table 1. The estimated per-
centage shortfalls in each period shown 
are the estimated coefficients for the 
time dummy variables for each period. 
The peak shortfall for U.S. imports from 
Canada was 2003, when U.S. imports 
were almost 26% below the level that 
would have been expected based upon 
pre-9/11 experience. By the first half of 
2005, U.S. imports from Canada were 
around 12% lower than what would be 
expected from the experience over the 
period 1996 Quarter 1 through 2002 
Quarter 2. This result implies that total 
imports from Canada were almost U.S. 
$12 billion less than they would other-
wise have been through the first half of 
2005. While we cannot with certainly 
ascribe this result entirely to 9/11, we 
did make an effort to rule out other ob-
vious causes of this trade shortfall. 
In a manner similar to aggregate im-
ports from Canada, the coefficients for 
the time dummy variables were estimat-
ed for U.S. exports to Canada over the 
full sample period. The estimated pat-
tern of coefficients for the time dummy 
variables indicates that the negative im-
pact of post-9/11 developments on U.S. 
exports to Canada increased between 
2001 Quarters 3 and 4 and then de-
creased consistently, at least for several 
versions of the model. In other versions 
of the model, there was a very modest 
increase in 2003 followed by a consis-
tent decrease. As Table 2 shows, this ear-
ly pattern for 9/11 impacts on exports 
is similar to that estimated for imports. 
One apparent difference between the 
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estimated coefficients for the years 2004 
and 2005 are statistically insignificant 
in the U.S. export equations, thereby 
suggesting that border congestion ef-
fects had apparently “disappeared” for 
northbound commercial shipments by 
the end of 2003. In contrast, statistical-
ly significant negative impacts on U.S. 
imports from Canada persisted through 
the 2005 period.
Besides estimating the impacts of 
9/11 on overall imports and exports, 
we estimated similar models for the ten 
largest U.S. land ports for trade with 
Canada. Graphing the data for imports 
and exports at the individual port level 
suggests that the experiences of the in-
dividual ports are not identical (see Fig-
ure 3). Our regression analysis revealed 
Table 1:  Estimated Import Shortfalls Following 9/11
	 	
Time Period Percentage Shortfall Dollar Amount Shortfall
	 	 (U.S.	Dollars)
2001	Quarter	3	 8.6%	 $5.2	Billion
2001	Quarter	4	 21.4%	 $10.8	Billion
2002	 19.4%	 $10.3	Billion
2003	 25.8%	 $13.7	Billion
2004	 17.5%	 $10.4	Billion
2005 (first 2 quarters) 12.2% $11.4 Billion
Table 2:  Estimated Export Shortfalls Following 9/11
Time Period Percentage Shortfall Dollar Amount Shortfall
	 	 (U.S.	Dollars)
2001	Quarter	3	 18.0%	 $5.5	Billion
2001	Quarter	4	 22.8%	 $8.2	Billion
2002	 19.8%	 $6.8	Billion
2003	 15.8%	 $7.3	Billion
2004	 3.9%	 $1.4	Billion
2005 (first 2 quarters) (5.8% increase) ($2.5 Billion increase)
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overall pattern of the estimated time 
period variables is fairly similar across 
the different ports, with the notable ex-
ceptions of Detroit and Buffalo/Niagara 
Falls. Specifically, the smallest impact 
was typically experienced in Quarter 3 
of 2001. The impact increased in Quar-
ter 4 of 2001 and then remained fair-
ly constant until either 2003 or 2004 
when the negative impact on trade was 
most pronounced for six of the ten top 
ports.2 
While the pattern of the coefficients 
for the time dummy variables is simi-
lar across ports in the import equa-
tions, there are also clear differences 
across ports in the magnitudes of the 
estimated coefficients for the individual 
time dummy variables. For example, in 
2005, imports from Canada through 
the port of Detroit were actually higher 
than “predicted” by the import equa-
tion. At the other extreme, the Ports 
of Champlain/Rouses Point and Port 
Huron were characterized by relatively 
large import shortfalls based on the re-
gression analysis. In the cases of these 
latter two ports, imports in the first half 
of 2005 were on the order of 25% below 
the levels that would be expected based 
upon the pre-9/11 experiences. Import 
shortfalls of around 20% are identifiable 
for the ports of Alexandria Bay, Portal 
and Sweetgrass. In the case of Blaine, 
an import shortfall of around 13% is 
estimated. Conversely, no statistically 
significant negative impact on imports 
from Canada can be identified for High-
gate Springs, Buffalo/Niagara Falls and 
Pembina. In sum, whereas all of the 
sample ports experienced a substan-
tial and statistically significant import 
shortfall at some point in the post-9/11 
period, only about half of the largest 
ports were still experiencing a signifi-
cant negative shortfall by the end of the 
first half of 2005.
The U.S. export equation for the full 
time period was then estimated for each 
of the ten largest ports in a similar man-
ner to the import equation estimation. 
Much greater variation in the pattern 
of estimated coefficients for the time 
dummy variables was observed in the 
case of the individual port export equa-
tions than in the comparable import 
equations. For example, for some ports, 
the negative impacts of post 9/11 de-
velopments decrease between 2003 and 
2005, whereas for others they increase. 
Differences across ports with respect 
to the estimated coefficients for indi-
vidual time periods are substantial. For 
example, statistically significant export 
shortfalls are identified for the ports of 
Sweetwater, Alexandria Bay and Cham-
plain/Rouses Point, but not for Highgate 
Springs, Buffalo/Niagara Falls, Blaine, 
Portal, Detroit and Port Huron. 
In summary, significant differences 
appear to exist across ports with respect 
to the estimated trade shortfalls in the 
post-9/11 period. This finding hints at 
  2Highgate Springs, Sweet-
grass and Blaine are ports 
exhibiting larger negative 
impacts on imports in 
2005 than in 2004.
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ence. Namely, efforts to ease border 
disruptions associated with security-re-
lated procedures may be more efficient-
ly undertaken by focusing them on the 
individual large ports exhibiting the 
greatest lingering trade shortfalls. We 
shall shortly discuss our efforts to iden-
tify the reason(s) for the different port 
experiences.
INTERPRETING THE RESULTS
While shortfalls in U.S. exports to 
Canada are estimated to have essentially 
disappeared by mid-2005, import short-
falls have apparently persisted. More-
over, the estimated import shortfalls are 
large, both in the aggregate as well as 
for specific individual border crossings. 
Indeed, our results point to more sub-
stantial adverse impacts on U.S. imports 
from Canada than have been suggested 
by other studies, to date. It is therefore 
appropriate to consider whether other 
phenomena may have adversely affected 
U.S. imports from Canada in the post-
9/11 period that may not be captured 
effectively in our statistical model.
An evaluation of this possibility in-
volved focusing on the trade sectors 
that are particularly important quanti-
tatively in the bilateral context with the 
following question in mind: were there 
any developments unrelated to border 
security that might have contributed to 
the post-9/11 Canadian import shortfall 
identified by our statistical model?  The 
most prominent sector in this regard is 
transportation equipment. A concern 
here is that offshore sourcing of parts 
and assembled vehicles displaced North 
American production, particularly pro-
duction in Canada, thereby contrib-
uting to reduced bilateral trade in the 
post-9/11 period; however, the evidence 
suggests that the competitive challenge 
from foreign producers was manifested 
not so much in terms of increased im-
ports from outside North America, but 
rather in increased sales from foreign-
owned plants, particularly Japanese-
owned plants, within North America. 
Furthermore, available information does 
not support a claim that Canadian au-
tomotive sector producers were less ef-
ficient than their U.S. counterparts such 
that more production would take place 
in the United States, thereby displacing 
imports from Canada. Rather, the op-
posite seems to be true, i.e., producers 
in Canada enjoyed a significant produc-
tivity advantage over their U.S.-based 
counterparts.
Another prominent trade sector is oil, 
gas and petroleum products. Oil and gas 
are primarily transported by pipeline, 
and it is, therefore, extremely unlikely 
that any decline in Canadian exports of 
these products could be attributable to 
border security-related developments. 
On the other hand, tanker trucks are an 
important mode of transport for petro-
leum products and, therefore, might be 
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Figure 3: Imports and Exports by Port (in millions of US $)
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disruptions. In the context of bilateral 
energy trade, a significant reduction in 
the price of petroleum products might 
lead to a measured decrease in Canadian 
exports of petroleum products unrelat-
ed to post-9/11 developments. Howev-
er, after declining slightly in 2001 and 
early 2002, an index of petroleum prod-
uct prices increased consistently from 
late 2002 through 2005, thereby miti-
gating the potential relevance of energy 
price reductions as a cause of the im-
port shortfall from Canada. In addition, 
there is no basis for arguing that U.S.-
based importers substituted petroleum 
product imports from outside North 
America for imports from Canada. 
As in the case of petroleum products, 
the value of bilateral trade in metals and 
metal products might be affected either 
by changes in the average prices of those 
products or because shipments of those 
products from outside North America 
displace bilateral trade. Again, these 
possibilities do not appear relevant. 
Specifically, price indices for base met-
als, after decreasing in 2001 and early 
2002, subsequently increased. Indeed, 
the increases in 2003 and 2004 were 
quite substantial ranging from a low of 
20% for aluminum to a high of 72% for 
lead. These data suggest that decreases 
in metal prices cannot plausibly con-
tribute to the estimated Canadian im-
port shortfall in the post-2002 period.
Finally, we considered the potential 
for forest products exports from Cana-
da to the U.S. to be seriously disrupted 
in the post-9/11 period by the dispute 
surrounding softwood lumber exports 
from Canada. The Softwood Lumber 
Agreement expired in March 2001 and 
was followed by a significant increase 
in shipments of softwood lumber for 
Canada to the United States. The U.S. 
Department of Commerce levied a pre-
liminary countervailing duty against 
lumber imports from Canada in Au-
gust 2001 followed by an anti-dumping 
duty. These duties remained in place (at 
different values) over the post-2001 pe-
riod. It must be acknowledged that the 
duties imposed by the U.S. government 
may have kept physical volumes of Ca-
nadian lumber below what they other-
wise would have been in the post-9/11 
period. In this regard, however, it might 
be noted that the absolute volume of Ca-
nadian softwood lumber exports to the 
United States actually increased in 2003 
and 2004 reflecting strong U.S. housing 
construction activity. Moreover, Cana-
da’s share of the U.S. softwood lumber 
market was relatively stable from 2002-
2004. In any case, a decrease in softwood 
lumber exports is unlikely to have con-
tributed substantially to the estimated 
shortfall in U.S. imports from Canada, 
since less than three percent of Canada’s 
total commodity exports to the U.S. are 
comprised of softwood lumber.
In summary, an assessment of pos-
sible post-9/11 developments affecting 
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larly from the perspective of Canadian 
exports to the United States, does not 
provide strong grounds for concern that 
we have unwittingly overlooked factors 
contributing to estimated trade short-
falls while ascribing the consequences 
of those factors to increased border se-
curity and its associated costs. Further-
more, while we are unable to offer any 
definitive explanations of the observed 
differences across ports in estimated 
trade shortfalls, our analysis rejects the 
notion that the differences are primar-
ily a consequence of differences in the 
commodity compositions of shipments 
passing through individual ports. Rath-
er, differences in trade shortfalls at the 
port level more likely reflect differences 
in conditions surrounding the infra-
structures of the ports, as well as in pro-
cedures followed at the various ports. 
POLICY CONCLUSIONS
Two broad approaches towards ad-
dressing the simultaneous need for bor-
der security and the relatively free flow 
of commercial shipments have been 
identified. One encompasses the bilat-
eral harmonization of border security 
policies along with a pooling of sover-
eignty to build a formal North Ameri-
can security perimeter. A second, less 
ambitious approach, involves a mixture 
of enhanced cross-border security coor-
dination and collaboration with partial 
and uneven policy convergence.
The first approach is envisaged to in-
volve the implementation of a border 
security perimeter in which commer-
cial shipments and travelers entering 
the North American “space” would face 
security screening at the point of en-
try. Once cleared to enter, shippers and 
other travelers could cross the Canada-
U.S. border presumably without the 
need for additional security evaluation. 
A model of a common external perim-
eter is the European Union’s Schengen 
Agreement. This agreement includes 
common visa and asylum policies, a 
shared information system and stan-
dardized border procedures. Adoption 
of a Schengen-type approach to creat-
ing a North American border security 
perimeter seems unlikely in the current 
political environment. Perhaps the most 
prominent reason is that Canadian offi-
cials see the harmonization of visa and 
related immigration policies as meaning 
that Canada must conform to U.S. poli-
cies, and they are reluctant to do so. 
If a total harmonization of security 
policies on a bilateral basis is neither 
practical nor (perhaps) desirable, what 
specific initiatives might be consid-
ered?  This question is obviously quite 
open-ended, since there are a myriad 
of potential initiatives that might be 
considered ranging from the relative-
ly mundane, e.g., increase personnel 
working at surface border crossings, to 
the futuristic, e.g., develop and deploy 
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ly and accurately confirm the content 
of cargo shipments, as well as confirm 
the identities of drivers. It is impossible 
to make recommendations at detailed 
levels of specificity; however, several 
general observations can be offered.
One broad observation is that econom-
ic incentives should be implemented to 
encourage investments in technology 
to facilitate more efficient and effective 
security screening procedures. For ex-
ample, shippers might be “risk-rated” by 
governments on the basis of the speed 
and reliability of the information that 
the shippers provide to government of-
ficials regarding their cargos and ship-
pers. Risk ratings might also be based on 
the intrinsic terrorism hazards posed by 
the cargo being shipped, as well as the 
ports through which they are shipped. 
Risk ratings might, in turn, be used to 
assess “user fees” applied to shippers 
that would presumably be passed along 
to final consumers. The fees collected 
from shippers would, in turn, be used 
for public investments in physical in-
frastructure and technology deployed 
at the border to help provide secure and 
expeditious border crossings.
A second broad observation is that 
border security policies might acknowl-
edge relevant differences in conditions 
and circumstances at individual border 
crossing locations. While our results 
identified differences in border crossing 
conditions across U.S. ports, it would 
not be surprising if similar differences 
could be identified for land ports on 
the Canadian side. While there are clear 
advantages to standardizing border se-
curity procedures across all ports, there 
is a strong case for allowing individual 
ports some leeway to differentiate strat-
egies and tactics to safeguard commer-
cial shipments from terrorist actions 
while permitting those shipments to 
flow freely across the border.
Finally, and notwithstanding our ear-
lier skepticism about the practicality 
and desirability of full integration of 
border security procedures on a bilat-
eral basis, it is clear that coordination 
of infrastructure investments by gov-
ernments on both sides of the border is 
imperative if infrastructure investments 
are to be effective. For example, capac-
ity expansions on one side of the bor-
der may have minimal impacts on the 
actual speed and consistency of ship-
ping times if bottlenecks on the other 
side persist. Moreover, there are likely 
to be significant cost savings by har-
monizing the timing of infrastructure 
investments on each side of the border. 
In this regard, investments being under-
taken under the auspices of the Govern-
ment of Canada’s Border Infrastructure 
Fund seem an appropriate approach, as 
they involve cooperation on the part of 
federal, provincial and local authorities 
including operators of bridges and tun-
nels that provide rights of way to ports 
on either side of the border.
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